This paper proposes the use of Bayesian potential games as models of informationally decentralized organizations. Applying techniques in team decision problems by Radner (1962) , this paper characterizes Bayesian Nash equilibria in terms of Bayesian potentials and demonstrates using examples that Bayesian potentials are useful tools for studying the efficient use of information in organizations.
Introduction
In an organization, individuals typically differ in at least three important respects: they control different actions; they base their decisions on different information; and they have different goals. Marshak and Radner (1972) develop team theory, arguing that interesting aspects of organizations mainly concern differences of actions and information (see Marshak 1955; Radner 1961 Radner , 1962 . A team is a model of an organization in which individuals with a common goal control different actions based upon different information. The common goal assumption is a technical requirement that makes the model mathematically tractable. From the viewpoint of game theory, a team is a Bayesian identical interest game where every player has an identical payoff function. Marshak and Radner (1972) characterize an optimal decision function, which is a Pareto efficient Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and study the efficient use of information in organizations.
Following Marshak and Radner (1972) , many studies on organizations have taken the team theoretical approach. Early works include Groves and Radner (1972) and Arrow and Radner (1979) . After more than a decade of limited use (time during which principalagent theory has played a dominant role in economic theory of organizations), team theory has been experiencing a renewed interest. Several authors have applied it to problems in economic theory of organizations that do not seem to find a satisfactory answer within the principal-agent framework. Examples include Crémer (1980 Crémer ( , 1990 Crémer ( , 1993 , Arrow (1985) , Aoki (1986 Aoki ( , 1995 , Itoh (1987) , Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) , Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) , Prat (1996 Prat ( , 2002 and Qian, Roland, and Xu (2006) . 1 In some cases, however, the common goal assumption of team theory seems too strong because more information is always more favorable when individuals have a common goal, whereas more information can be less favorable when individuals have different goals, as demonstrated by Levine and Ponssard (1977) , Bassan, Scarsini, and Zamir (1997) and Morris and Shin (2002) , among others, in game theoretical frameworks.
2 This suggests that a theoretical result for teams can be quite different from one for organizations other than teams. It will be useful if we have a model of an organization such that it is as mathematically tractable as a team and it does not require the common goal assumption.
Motivated by the above observation, we propose the use of a Bayesian potential game (Monderer and Shapley 1996; van Heumen, Peleg, Tijs, and Borm 1996) as a model of an organization. That is, we consider a model of an organization in which individuals with different goals control different actions based upon different information such that it possesses a potential function. A game is a potential game if there exists a potential function defined on the action space with the property that the change in any player's payoff function from switching between any two of his or her actions (holding other players' actions fixed) is equal to the change in the potential function (Monderer and Shapley 1996) . In a potential game, the set of Nash equilibria is the same as that of an identical interest game such that every player's payoff function is identical to the potential function. A Bayesian game is said to be a Bayesian potential game if, for each state, a fictitious game composed of a payoff function profile at the state is a potential game (van Heumen, Peleg, Tijs, and Borm 1996) . In a Bayesian potential game, the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria is the same as that of a Bayesian identical interest game, or a team, such that every player's payoff function is identical to the potential function at every state.
Once we have constructed a model of an organization using a Bayesian potential game, we can characterize its Bayesian Nash equilibria using techniques of team theory because the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria is the same as that of the team. Using the results of Radner (1962) , we argue that if a potential function is concave at every state, then any Bayesian Nash equilibrium must be a Pareto efficient Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the team, and that if a potential function is concave and quadratic at every state and private signals are normally distributed, then the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is linear in private signals. In the latter case, we can obtain the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a closed form.
This argument applies to a larger class of Bayesian games, which we call Bayesian bestresponse potential games. A Bayesian game is said to be a Bayesian best-response potential game if interim best-response correspondences of the Bayesian game coincide with those of a Bayesian identical interest game, or a team.
3 In a Bayesian best-response potential game, the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria is the same as that of the team, and, therefore, we can use techniques of team theory. We show that a class of Bayesian best-response potential games is strictly larger than that of (weighted) Bayesian potential games.
Using examples, we demonstrate how our approach works in studying the efficient use of information. The examples apply a parametrized class of two-player, symmetric, quadratic Bayesian potential games with normally distributed private signals. First, we provide conditions for the parameters under which most precise information is most favorable, and under which most precise information is least favorable. Next, we examine the result of Crémer (1990) comparing two information structures in teams: shared knowledge and diversified knowledge. 4 Shared knowledge refers to an information structure in which every individual has the same information and diversified knowledge refers to an information structure in which every individual has conditionally independent information. Crémer (1990) shows that shared knowledge is better than diversified knowledge if and only if a team exhibits strategic complementarity. We show that this is true for organizations other than teams. Finally, we examine the result of Morris and Shin (2002) considering welfare effects of public information in Bayesian coordination games with strategic complementarity. They demonstrate that more private information always results in more efficiency, whereas more public information might result in less efficiency depending upon the accuracy of private information. We show that this is true for a larger class of Bayesian games with a slightly different setup. Basar and Ho (1974) were the first to use the results of Radner (1962) for Bayesian games. They consider two-player quadratic Bayesian games with normally distributed private signals, which include Bayesian duopoly games with linear demand functions, and demonstrate that the calculation of Bayesian Nash equilibria is reduced to that in teams. Following Basar and Ho (1974) , many papers on information sharing in Bayesian oligopoly games with linear demand functions have taken the same approach: see Clark (1983) , Gal-Or (1985 , Vives (1984 Vives ( , 1988 and Raith (1996) , among others. It is worth pointing out that Bayesian games studied in the above papers form a special class of Bayesian potential games because oligopoly games with linear demand functions are potential games, as shown by Slade (1994) . In contrast, the present paper uses the results of Radner (1962) for a larger class of Bayesian best-response potential games, generalizing the approach taken in the above papers for broader purposes. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) study the efficient use of information using continuum-of-player quadratic Bayesian potential games with normally distributed private signals. A finite-player version of their Bayesian games also forms a special class of Bayesian potential games that we study.
Section 2 reviews potential games as a preparation for studying Bayesian potential games. Section 3 introduces Bayesian potential games. Section 4 characterizes Bayesian Nash equilibria using the results of Radner (1962) . Using examples, Section 5 demonstrates how our approach works. Section 6 discusses the extension to Bayesian best-response potential games.
Potential games
A game (with complete information) consists of a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, a set of actions A i for i ∈ N, and a payoff function g i : A → R for i ∈ N, where A = i ∈N A i . We write A −i = j = i A j . We simply denote a game by g = (g i ) i ∈N . In this paper, it will be assumed that A i ⊆ R is an interval for each i ∈ N. We regard a ∈ A as a column vector in R n . Potential games and weighted potential games are formally defined by Monderer and Shapley (1996) . Definition 1 A game g is a weighted potential game if there exists a weighted potential function f : A → R with a constant w i > 0 such that
For example, consider g such that
where v : A → R and c i :
We regard g as a simple model of a firm, where v(a) is the total value produced by the firm, v(a)/n is each player's share of the value, and c i (a i ) is the private cost of player i choosing a i ∈ A i . This game is a potential game with a potential function
Hart and Moore (1990) consider a model of a firm that generalizes the above game where each player's share of the value is not necessarily equal and determined by the "Shapley value" rule. As shown by Ui (2000) , the model of Hart and Moore (1990) is also a potential game. A weighted potential function f is a useful tool in finding Nash equilibria. To see this, observe that
for all a i , a i ∈ A i , where λ i is a probability measure on A −i . Therefore, arg max
which implies the following lemma. The following two lemmas contain necessary and sufficient conditions for potential games.
Lemma 2 (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) Suppose that g i is twice continuously differentiable for each i ∈ N. A game g is a potential game if and only if
Moreover, for an arbitrary fixed b ∈ A, a potential function is given by
where
is a piecewise continuously differentiable path in A that connects b to a; that is, x(0) = a and x(1) = b.

Lemma 3 (Ui, 2000) For a subset of players S ⊆ N, let A S = i ∈S A i be a restricted action space with a generic element a S = (a i ) i ∈S . A game g is a potential game if and only if there exists a collection of functions
for all a ∈ A and i ∈ N. A potential function is given by
Consider a game with quadratic payoff functions such that
where q ii , q i j and θ i are constants and h i :
By Lemma 2, g is a potential game if and only if
Let us find a potential function using Lemma 3. 5 For this purpose, we can assume h i (a −i ) = 0 without loss of generality because, by the definition of potential games, if f is a potential function of g then it is also a potential function of g with
and, therefore, the potential function is
To summarize, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4 A game g of the above form is a potential game if and only if q i j
If Q is a positive definite matrix, then a * = Q −1 θ is the unique maximizer of f . In addition, it is the unique equilibrium of g according to Neyman (1997) , who shows that a potential maximizer is a unique correlated equilibrium of a potential game if a potential function is continuously differentiable and strictly concave. We will argue analogous results for Bayesian potential games.
Bayesian potential games
A Bayesian game consists of a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, a set of actions A i for i ∈ N, a probability space ( , F, P ), a payoff function u i : A × → R for i ∈ N, and a measurable space (Y i , Y i ) with a measurable mapping η i : → Y i for i ∈ N. We write u = (u i ) i ∈N and η = (η i ) i ∈N . Because we will fix N , A and ( , F, P ) throughout the paper, we simply denote a Bayesian game by (u, η). We call η an information structure of (u, η). It will be assumed that, for each i ∈ N, A i ⊆ R is an interval and
A strategy of player i ∈ N is a measurable mapping σ i : Y i → A i . Let i be the set of strategies of player i ∈ N. We write = i ∈N i and −i = j = i j . We sometimes omit ω in writing η i (ω). Therefore, we write
, all of which are regarded as random variables.
A strategy profile σ ∈ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if, for a.e.
The first-order condition for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is
for a.e. y i ∈ Y i and i ∈ N. Let U i : → R be the ex ante expected payoff function:
A strategy profile σ ∈ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and
Bayesian potential games and weighted Bayesian potential games are introduced by van Heumen, Peleg, Tijs, and Borm (1996) . For a weighted Bayesian potential game (u, η) with a weighted Bayesian potential
Therefore, the first-order condition for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in (u, η) and that in (v, η) are the same, and so are the interim best responses: arg max
for all σ i , σ i ∈ i and σ −i ∈ −i . Therefore, V is a weighted potential function of (u, η) in the sense of Definition 1. All of the above leads us to the following lemma.
Lemma 5 (van Heumen, Peleg, Tijs, and Borm 1996) The set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of (u, η) coincides with that of (v, η) . In particular, a potential maximizer σ * ∈ arg max σ ∈ V (σ ) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (u, η) if it exists.
Consider a Bayesian game with quadratic payoff functions such that where q i j : → R, θ i : → R, and h i :
The following lemma is a straightforward consequence of Lemma 4.
Lemma 6 A Bayesian game (u, η) of the above form is a Bayesian potential game if and only if q i j
For example, if q ii (ω) = α and q i j (ω) = β for all i = j and ω ∈ , where α, β ∈ R are constants, then (u, η) is a Bayesian potential game with a Bayesian potential function
A continuun-of-player version of this Bayesian potential game is studied by Angeletos and Pavan (2007) . Radner (1962) defines (v, η) to be a team, whose origin is the work of Marshak (1955) . Radner (1962) calls a strategy profile a decision function of a team, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium a person-by-person maximal decision function, a strategy profile satisfying the first-order condition a stationary decision function, and a Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium a Bayes decision function. Radner (1962) discusses conditions under which every stationary decision function is Bayes. In our words, they are conditions under which a strategy profile satisfying the first-order condition in (v, η) , which is also that in (u, η), maximizes V . This observation leads us to the following theorems, all of which are immediate consequences of those of Radner (1962) .
According to Theorem 1 of Radner (1962) , if a weighted Bayesian potential function v is concave, then a strategy profile satisfying the first-order condition maximizes V . Therefore, if the maximizer of V is unique, it must be the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium satisfying the first-order condition. The theorem requires the assumption of local finiteness. We say that V is locally finite at σ ∈ if |V (σ )| < ∞ and, for any
Theorem 1 Let (u, η) be a weighted Bayesian potential game with a weighted Bayesian potential function v. Suppose that
If σ ∈ satisfies the first-order condition for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and V is locally finite at σ , then σ maximizes V .
It is not easy to verify the local finiteness condition. Krainak, Speyer, and Marcus (1982) obtain an extension of theorem 1 of Radner (1962) with a condition that is easier to verify in some cases. The following theorem is its translation to our setup with Bayesian potential games. As Krainak, Speyer, and Marcus (1982) show, the condition in Theorem 1 is sufficient for the condition in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let (u, η) be a weighted Bayesian potential game with a weighted Bayesian potential function v. Suppose that
If σ ∈ satisfies the first-order condition for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and, for every
exists for each i ∈ N, then σ maximizes V .
For example, let (u, η) be a Bayesian potential game considered in Lemma 6 and define
According to Theorem 4 of Radner (1962) , if Q(ω) is positive definite and r > 0, then the condition in Theorem 1 (and thus Theorem 2) is satisfied. Clearly, if Q(ω) is a constant positive definite matrix, we must have r > 0. Furthermore, according to Theorem 5 of Radner (1962) , the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is unique and linear in private signals. 
Theorem 4 Suppose that Q(ω)
for all y i ∈ Y i and i ∈ N and σ i is a linear function of η i .
By the above theorem, we can obtain a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a closed form. Let C i j be the covariance matrix of η i and η j . Assume that η i has mean zero. Let G i be the covariance matrix of η i and θ i . In summary,
Then, by the property of multivariate normal distributions,
Let σ be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium such that
for each i ∈ N. Plugging this into (2), we have
ii y i for all y i ∈ Y i and i ∈ N. Therefore, a vector b i and a constant c i are determined by the system of linear equations
This is reduced to the following form:
Information structures and efficiency
To study the relationship between information structures and efficiency, we propose the following steps of analysis. For the first step, construct a model of an organization using a Bayesian potential game. This method is not only less restrictive than using a team but also not uncommon, as discussed in Section 2. For the second step, consider information structures η and η , and obtain the corresponding Bayesian Nash equilibria using the results in Section 4. For the third step, compute the sum of ex ante expected payoffs of all the 7 Let X = (X 1 , X 2 ) be a random vector whose distribution is multivariate normal. Let μ i = EX i and
players for each information structure and compare them. If the sum for η is greater than that for η , then we conclude that η is better than η . For example, consider a two-player, symmetric, quadratic Bayesian potential game:
where θ 1 , θ 2 , η 1 and η 2 are jointly normally distributed and |ρ| < 1. Note that if α = β = 1 then players have the same payoff functions (except the term f i (ω)) and this Bayesian potential game is a team. By Lemma 6, (u, η) has a Bayesian potential function
Note that v(·, ω) :
A → R is concave because |ρ| < 1. The following games conform to the above formulation (with suitable normalization).
• A model of a firm studied by Crémer (1990) has the following payoff functions
where B, C > 0 are constants. Note that, for i = 1, 2,
Therefore, if C > B then the game exhibits strategic complementarity and if B > C then it exhibits strategic substitutability.
• A model of Cournot duopoly with a linear demand function has the following payoff functions:
where θ 0 (ω) is a parameter for the demand structure and c i (θ ) is a marginal cost for firm i = 1, 2.
• A two-player version of a coordination game studied by Morris and Shin (2002) has the following payoff functions:
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 is a constant. In this game, player i's best response is his or her expected value of a weighted average of the opponent's action σ j (η j ) and the unknown parameter
Using Theorem 4, we shall obtain a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a closed form. For the parameters of the joint normal distribution of (θ 1 , θ 2 , η 1 , η 2 ), we assume
= 0 and the following symmetric covariance structure:
Plugging the above into (4), solving it for b i and c i , and plugging b i and c i into (3), we have the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium
for i = 1, 2. We evaluate welfare in terms of the sum of ex ante expected payoffs:
where f = E f 1 + E f 2 . Note that, in general, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ * does not maximize W unless both players have the same payoff functions or independent payoff functions.
We study comparative statics on W (σ * ) with respect to information structures. To do so, we consider a more specific information structure given by
where θ , ε 0 , ε 1 and ε 2 are independently and normally distributed with
Then, C = ξ + φ + ψ, D = ξ + φ and G = ξ . We will fix ξ > 0 throughout and regard (φ, ψ) ∈ R 2 + as a parameter for an information structure (η 1 , η 2 ). Note that if (φ, ψ) = (0, 0) then θ is common knowledge. Plugging the above into (5) and (6), we have
We first compare welfare under common knowledge of θ and that under other information structures.
PROOF: Remember that |ρ| < 1 is assumed. Rewrite
.
Because A is a positive constant times 1 − α and B is a positive constant times β, this proposition is true.
This proposition asserts that common knowledge of θ results in the highest efficiency if α ≤ 1 and β ≥ 0, whereas it results in the lowest efficiency if α ≥ 1 and β ≤ 0. It should be noted that (φ, ψ) , as we will see in Proposition 3. Crémer (1990) compares two information structures in a team: shared knowledge and diversified knowledge. Shared knowledge is an information structure (φ, ψ) = (c , 0), where players have the same information. Diversified knowledge is an information structure (φ, ψ) = (0, c ), where players have conditionally independent information. Crémer (1990) shows that shared knowledge is better than diversified knowledge in a team if and only if a team exhibits strategic complementarity; that is, ρ ≥ 0.
9 We obtain the same conclusion if α ≤ 1 and β ≥ 0, but the opposite conclusion if α ≥ 1 and β ≤ 0. PROOF: By calculation, we have
. Note that if the game is a team, then α = β = 1, satisfying the former assumption α ≤ 1 and β ≥ 0, which is the result of Crémer (1990) . Morris and Shin (2002) study information structures where private signals consist of public information and private information. They show that more private information always increases efficiency, whereas more public information might decrease efficiency. We have a similar claim in our setup when α ≤ 1 and β ≥ 0.
Proposition 3 Let
Suppose that α ≥ 1 and β ≤ 0. Then,
PROOF: Immediate from the following calculation:
An increase in the variance of public noise φ corresponds to a decrease in the accuracy of public information, and an increase in the variance of private noise ψ corresponds to a decrease in the accuracy of private information. Given this interpretation, the claim of the above proposition when α ≤ 1 and β ≥ 0 is similar to that of Morris and Shin (2002) .
Bayesian best-response potential games
An analysis of a weighted Bayesian potential game is reduced to team decision problems. This is because the equilibrium set coincides with that of a team. Conversely, it is worth asking what class of Bayesian games have the same equilibrium set as that of a team.
For games with complete information, Morris and Ui (2004) study such a class of games. A game g is said to be best-response equivalent to g if, for each i ∈ N, arg max
for any probability measure λ i on A −i such that the integrals exist. Morris and Ui (2004) consider a game that is best-response equivalent to an identical interest game, and call the game a best-response potential game. They show that if v is concave then a class of best-response potential games is strictly larger than that of weighted potential games.
We introduce the "Bayesian" version of best-response potential games. We say that (u, η) is best-response equivalent to (u , η) if, for each i ∈ N, arg max
for all σ −i ∈ −i and y i ∈ Y i such that the interim expected payoffs exist. We consider a Bayesian game that is best-response equivalent to a Bayesian identical interest game, and call the game a Bayesian best-response potential game. A weighted Bayesian potential game is a Bayesian best-response potential game, as described in Section 3. By the definition of Bayesian Nash equilibria, the equilibrium set of a Bayesian best-response potential game coincides with that of the Bayesian identical interest game. The above lemma implies that the results in Section 4 hold even if "weighted Bayesian potential" is replaced by "Bayesian best-response potential." Therefore, we are interested in Bayesian best-response potential games with concave Bayesian best-response potential functions. The following theorem characterizes such a class of Bayesian best-response potential games.
Theorem 5 Let (u, η) be a Bayesian game. Let v : A × → R be continuously differentiable and concave with respect to a ∈ A. Suppose that, for each i ∈ N, there exists a function
for all a ∈ A and ω ∈ . Suppose further that sup a i ∈ (α,β),
) is a Bayesian best-response potential game with a Bayesian best-response potential function v.
Before proving the theorem, let us discuss a simple but useful application to robustness of equilibrium sets. Let (u, η) be a Bayesian potential game with a Bayesian potential function v that is continuously differentiable and concave with respect to a ∈ A. Let (u , η) be another Bayesian game such that
for all a ∈ A, ω ∈ , and i ∈ N, where w i : Y i → R ++ is a η i -measurable random variable taking a strictly positive value. By Theorem 5, (u , η) is a Bayesian best-response potential game with a Bayesian best-response potential function v. Therefore, by Lemma 7, the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of (u , η) coincides with that of (u, η) . In other words, the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of (u, η) is robust to random disturbances of payoff functions of the form (8).
To prove the theorem, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 8 For each σ −i ∈ −i and y i ∈ Y i such that the interim expected payoffs exist, and, therefore, [v((x 
. Thus, by the monotone convergence theorem, we must have (9). The concavity of v also implies that ∂v(a, ω)/∂a i is decreasing in a i ∈ A i .
Hence, for any α, β, x ∈ A i with α < x < β, (7) implies that
by the mean-value theorem such that
Therefore,
Because the right-hand side is integrable with respect to E [ · | η i (ω) = y i ], by the dominated convergence theorem, we must have (10).
PROOF OF THEOREM 5: By (7), (9) and (10),
This implies that
By the concavity of v, ∂v(a, ω)/∂a i is decreasing in a i , and, therefore, both sides of (9) are decreasing in a i . Accordingly,
if and only if (11) is 0 or positive for all a i < a * i and 0 or negative for all a i > a * i . This is true if and only if 
for all a ∈ A and ω ∈ . As an example, we consider a finite-player version of a coordination game studied by Morris and Shin (2002) , which induces strategic behavior in the spirit of the "beauty contest" example of Keynes (1936) . Assume that n ≥ 3. The payoff function is given by
where 0 < λ < 1 and
Then, we can calculate the following:
where ρ = (n − 1)(n − 2) n 2 − (3n − 2)λ λ, c = 1 − 3n − 2 n 2 λ.
Note that ρ → λ and c → 1 as n → ∞, which corresponds to the infinite-player case. By the first-order condition given by (13), we can determine that player i's best response is a weighted sum of the conditional expectation of the opponents' actions j =i σ j (η j )/(n − 1) and that of θ 0 (ω); that is,
for all y i ∈ Y i . This represents the spirit of the "beauty contest" example, and Angeletos and Pavan (2007) call this game a beauty contest game. In this game, Morris and Shin (2002) study information structures where private signals consist of public information and private information, and show that more private information always increase efficiency, whereas more public information may decrease efficiency. Following Morris and Shin (2002) , the payoff function of the form (12) is widely discussed. However, it is an open question to provide a proper microfoundation. In contrast, the essence of Morris and Shin (2002) lies in the best response of the form (14), not in the specific payoff function of the form (12). Therefore, it is interesting and important to ask what class of Bayesian games have the best response of the form (13). Corollary 6 provides an answer to this question.
To see this, observe that, by Lemma 6, the above game is a weighted Bayesian potential game with a weighted Bayesian potential function Note that ∂v/∂a i is equal to the left-hand side of (13) divided by c (1 − ρ). Now, consider the following payoff function.
where f i (·, y i ) : A i → R is a continuously differentiable, strictly increasing function for each i ∈ N and y i ∈ Y i . Then, by Corollary 6, (u , η) is a Bayesian best-response potential game with a Bayesian best-response potential function v, and player i's best response is a weighted average of the conditional expectation of j =i σ j (η j )/(n − 1) and that of θ 0 (ω). It can be shown that the game studied by Morris and Shin (2002) is a special case with 
